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MARYLAND'S DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY 
STATUTE OF 1988- INTRODUCTION TO 
A SYMPOSIUM 
Arnold Rochvargt 
In February 1988 Maryland's Governor Schaefer signed emergency 
legislation 1 permitting a corporation incorporated in Maryland to in-
clude in its articles of incorporation a provision eliminating any liability 
of its directors and officers for money damages to the corporation or its 
stockholders unless the director or officer received an improper personal 
benefit or acted with active and deliberate dishonesty. 2 In light of the 
controversy which surrounds limitation of director and officer liability 
statutes in general, 3 and the Maryland statute in particular, this issue of 
the University of Baltimore Law Review contains a symposium on Mary-
land's Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988. 
The first article, "Let Stockholders Decide: The Origins of the 
Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988" provides a use-
ful introduction to the statute. Written by two practitioners, James J. 
Hanks, Jr. and Larry P. Scriggins, both members of the Maryland State 
Bar Association subcommittee which drafted the legislation, the article 
sets forth the justifications for the statute, its legislative history, and its 
operation. According to Messrs. Hanks and Scriggins, the justifications 
for the statute include: (1) a crisis in the availability and cost of director 
and officer (D&O) liability insurance;4 (2) an increased willingness of the 
courts to second-guess business decisions of corporate management; 5 and 
(3) difficulty in attracting persons to serve on the boards of directors of 
public corporations because of the fear of liability.6 The article then re-
t B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., George Washington University School of 
Law; Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
l. Act of Feb. 18, 1988, ch. 3, 1988 Md. Laws 739. Unlike most legislation in Mary-
land which is signed by the Governor after the legislative session, this legislation 
was signed during the session and took effect immediately. 
2. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS. CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988). The 1988 legislation 
also amended provisions of the Maryland General Corporation Law concerning in-
demnification of directors and officers. See id. § 2-418. 
3. See, e.g., Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom -
The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 171 (1987); Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty 
of Care, 42 SW. L.J. 919 (1988). 
4. Hanks & Scriggins, Let Stockholders Decide: The Origins of the Maryland Director 
and Officer Liability Statute of 1988, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 235, 235 (1989). 
5. !d. at 235-37. 
6. !d. at 237. 
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views in detail the legislative history of the statute. In 1987 legislation 
was proposed by the Bar Association Subcommittee to the Maryland 
Legislature as a "self executing" as opposed to a "charter option" stat-
ute. The original proposal limited liability not only to the corporation 
and its stockholders, but also to third parties. Its drafters maintained 
that the proposed legislation would (1) discourage Maryland corpora-
tions from reincorporating in other states, 7 (2) encourage new incorpora-
tions in Maryland, 8 and (3) add to the perception that Maryland is a 
state with a "favorable and responsible business climate."9 Although the 
Maryland Senate approved the bill, the House of Delegates Judiciary 
Committee gave it an unfavorable report primarily because it limited 
third-party actions and because it applied automatically to all Maryland 
corporations without any shareholder vote. The 1987 bill was subse-
quently defeated by the full House of Delegates. 10 
After some public outrage and threats from the expected benefi-
ciaries of the defeated legislation to reincorporate outside of Maryland, 11 
the Bar Association Subcommittee drafted a new bill and presented it to 
the legislature. This bill did not automatically apply to all corporations; 
instead it required shareholder approval. Moreover, it did not limit lia-
bility to third parties. The 1988 bill did, however, add officers to the 
liability limitation, and expanded the range of improper conduct covered 
by the liability limitation. This 1988 bill won easy approval in both the 
Senate and House, and was signed by the Governor as emergency legisla-
tion on February 18, 1988. 
In the final part of their article, Hanks and Scriggins discuss some of 
the effects of the new statute. They contend that the new statute is not a 
major expansion of shareholders' authority because sections of the Mary-
land General Corporation Law already permit shareholders to include 
provisions in the articles of incorporation regulating the functioning of 
their corporation. 12 They next discuss the very broad range of conduct 
that can be protected from liability. The Maryland statute offers liability 
protection from more misconduct than does the comparable Delaware 
statute. 13 For example, directors and officers of Maryland corporations 
can be absolved from liability even if their behavior constitutes inten-
tional misconduct and self-dealing. Hanks and Scriggins justify the ex-
pansiveness of the Maryland statute as part of "the broad right of 
stockholders to decide for themselves the allocation of the economic risk 
of directors' or officers' misconduct." 14 The broad language of the Mary-
7. /d. at 240. 
8. /d. 
9. /d. 
10. /d. at 242. 
11. /d. at 242-43. 
12. /d. at 246. 
13. /d. at 246-47. 
14. /d. at 252. 
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land statute, they argue, will promote clarity and certainty. 15 
In conclusion, Hanks and Scriggins maintain that the new statute 
will encourage competent persons to serve as directors and officers of 
Maryland corporations, and will keep Maryland corporations from rein-
corporating elsewhere. 16 In addition, the statute will not lead to self-
dealing or other misconduct because directors and officers still face liabil-
ity from lawsuits by third parties, and exposure to lawsuits for equitable 
relief by the corporation and its stockholders. 17 In sum, they conclude it 
is a beneficial statute. 
The second article, written by Professor Mark Sargent and entitled 
"Two Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute," 
both praises and criticizes the statute. Professor Sargent believes that a 
statute which permits shareholders to limit liability for directors' or of-
ficers' breach of duty of care is a useful means of aligning the interests of 
shareholders and managers in public corporations. He is troubled, how-
ever, because the statute permits the corporation to limit liability for 
breaches of duty of loyalty. 
Sargent reminds us that despite some rhetoric to the contrary, the 
imposition of money damages for breaches of duty of care is very rare, 
and the courts' commitment to the business judgment rule has been "un-
bending."18 He believes this is the proper position for the courts. The 
unwillingness of courts to review business decisions is an "expression of 
the specialization of functions within the nexus of contracts encapsulated 
in the public corporation."19 Moreover, minimization of personal liabil-
ity of directors for business decisions actually benefits shareholders be-
cause directors will not become excessively risk averse if they are 
protected from liability.20 Sargent argues that the courts' reluctance to 
impose personal liability for breach of duty of care is further justified by 
the fact that, unlike other professionals, directors cannot absorb the risk 
of personal liability into the cost of doing business by charging clients a 
price that reflects the risk. 21 
Professor Sargent asks, however, why liability limitation statutes 
such as Maryland's are needed if courts are so reluctant to impose per-
sonal liability on directors for breaches of duty of care? Although one 
explanation is that these statutes exist because of a decline in the availa-
bility and affordability of D&O insurance, Sargent questions the exist-
ence of any fundamental change in the law of director liability that 
would justify any radical change in the cost or availability of D&O insur-
15. /d. at 240. 
16. /d. at 252. 
17. /d. 
18. Sargent, Two Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute, 18 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 278, 286 (1989). 
19. /d. at 288. 
20. /d. 
21. /d. at 289. 
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ance.22 Unlike other commentators, Sargent does not go so far as to ar-
gue that director and officer liability limitation statutes are really 
insurance industry protection statutes. 23 He believes instead that the ul-
timate motivation for the enactment of such statutes is a general sense of 
uncertainty about the direction of the law among corporate management, 
their counsel and their insurers. 24 The Maryland statute mitigates that 
uncertainty and helps ensure that the risk of liability for breaches of duty 
of care will continue to be insignificant. The Maryland statute is there-
fore worthy of some praise. 
On the other hand, as Sargent points out, the Maryland statute dif-
fers from its Delaware counterpart by permitting limitation of liability 
for breaches of duty of loyalty. Although some have suggested that the 
distinction between duty of care and duty of loyalty is not a useful one,25 
Sargent disagrees. He believes that judicial monitoring of duty of loyalty 
violations can be effective (as opposed to judicial monitoring of duty of 
care) because courts are capable of deciding issues of fairness and hon-
esty,26 and because duty of loyalty cases often involve concealment of 
crucial facts. 27 Because the Maryland statute treats duty of care and 
duty of loyalty identically, i.e., it permits the limitation of liability for 
breaches of both duties, Sargent concludes that the Maryland statute is 
"misguided" and finds the Delaware statute preferable. 28 
Finally, Sargent discusses the implications of the statute for closely 
held corporations. He concludes that a statute limiting liability for 
breaches of duty of care in a closely held corporation is "largely innocu-
ous."29 Loyalty issues, however, are important in close corporations. 
Eliminating liability for breaches of duty of loyalty in a closely held cor-
poration therefore is undesirable. 30 In sum, Sargent's review of the . 
Maryland statute is a mixture of praise and criticism. 
In his article, "Consent, Exit, and the Contract Model of the Corpo-
ration," Professor Dennis R. Honabach also gives the new legislation a 
mixed review. After reviewing various aspects of the statute, and point-
ing out that the statute will have no effect on a disgruntled shareholder 
who petitions a court to enjoin or rescind a board's decision,31 Honabach 
criticizes the drafters' justifications for the Maryland statute and finds all 
22. /d. at 290-95. 
23. /d. 
24. /d. at 294. 
25. See, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in 
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 
(1986). 
26. Sargent, supra note 18, at 298. 
27. Id. at 299. 
28. /d. 
29. /d. at 306. 
30. /d. at 307. 
31. Honabach, Consent, Exit, and the Contract Model of the Corporation-A Commen-
tary on Maryland's New Director and Officer Liability Limiting and Indemnification 
Legislation, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 310, 312-17 (1989). 
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of them flawed. He argues that although the compensation paid to direc-
tors and officers is insignificant relative to their risks, responsibilities, and 
potential liability, the amount of compensation is irrelevant and the im-
position of liability is fair so long as they understand the risks involved 
before assuming the job. 32 In response to the argument that absent a 
liability limitation statute fewer persons will be willing to serve on boards 
of directors, Honabach maintains that private agreements can offer suffi-
cient protection, and, moreover, that there is no proof of a "talent" 
shortage. 33 He disputes the argument that the statute will aid the econ-
omy of Maryland by reducing the incentive for Maryland corporations to 
reincorporate elsewhere, arguing that no nexus exists between the sound-
ness of a state's economy and the number of corporations incorporated 
there. 34 Moreover, because most Maryland corporations are small, local 
businesses, it is very unlikely that they would reincorporate elsewhere. 
Finally, Honabach questions the rationale that the new statute can be 
justified as empowering shareholders to fashion their own governance 
rules. 35 For example, the new provisions do not in all instances permit 
the elimination of personal liability of directors and officers for money 
damages to the corporation and its stockholders, nor does it permit elimi-
nation of lawsuits seeking equitable relief. In sum, Honabach concludes 
that the Maryland statute cannot be supported by the reasons offered by 
its drafters. 
Honabach does however, believe that in some aspects, the new stat-
ute can be supported by the contract theory of corporations. The con-
tract theory views the corporation as a nexus of contracts. 36 Where one 
of the parties to such contracts - shareholders - are for the most part 
capable of protecting their own interests. Under the contract theory, 
corporate governance rules are best determined not by legislatively or 
judicially imposed rules but through the private bargaining process 
among the corporate participants. 37 Furthermore, because governance 
rules are public information, the price of a share of stock will reflect all 
information about the corporation, including its governance rules. 38 In 
most instances, shareholders displeased with the rules adopted can sell 
their shares and invest in corporations with different rules. Therefore, a 
shareholder who retains his stock or purchases stock can be deemed to 
consent to whatever rules the state or the other shareholders adopt. 
Even under the contract theory, Honabach sees problems with the 
Maryland statute because the Maryland statute applies to shareholders 
who cannot be deemed to have consented to its provisions. 39 Although 
32. /d. at 319. 
33. /d. 
34. /d. at 321-24. 
35. /d. at 324-28. 
36. !d. at 333. 
37. !d. at 334. 
38. !d. 
39. /d. at 337. 
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sometimes a shareholder will be deemed to have consented to the govern-
ance rules through his purchase or retention of stock, Honabach main-
tains that a shareholder cannot be deemed to have consented to certain 
fundamental unforeseeable changes in the governance rules such as the 
elimination of liability for breach of duty of care and duty of loyalty.40 
Moreover, a shareholder who continues to hold his shares can be deemed 
to consent only if he could otherwise sell his shares. But this is not true 
with respect to shareholders in closely held corporations. Thus, even 
under the contract theory of corporations, the statute should not be ap-
plied to closely held corporations.41 Honabach suggests that the statute 
be amended so that it applies only to shareholders who consent to the 
new governance rules. He suggests that one solution would be to grant 
the appraisal remedy to those dissenting shareholders whose corpora-
tions adopt a liability limitation provision pursuant to the statute.42 
In their article "Free at Last? The Contractual Theory of the Cor-
poration and the New Maryland Officer-Director Liability Provisions," 
Professors Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein also discuss the con-
tract theory of corporations under the Maryland statute and, although 
they too express reservations about it under the contract theory, they 
believe that granting more contractual freedom to corporate participants 
will help solve the director liability problem.43 They therefore suggest 
that legislatures fully adopt the contract theory of corporations and give 
free rein to private parties to draft managerial contracts.44 The costs of 
judicially enforced fiduciary duties may far exceed the benefits of control~ 
ling managerial misconduct and, thus, it may make more economic sense 
for shareholders to contract away completely the right to sue directors 
for breaches of fiduciary duty.45 Moreover, judicially imposed govern-
ance rules may cause management to act more conservatively than share-
holders desire.46 Judicial second-guessing of corporate decisions also 
creates significant error cost.47 In any event, according to Butler and 
Ribstein, the proper remedy is for the parties themselves to privately 
fashion their own rules. The fact that the parties bear the costs them-
selves creates the greatest incentive to adopt efficient rules. Private or-
dering, not mandatory legal rules, Butler and Ribstein maintain, leads to 
optimal corporate arrangements.48 
Butler and Ribstein praise the statute for permitting shareholders to 
40. /d. at 339-40. 
41. /d. at 344. 
42. Id. at 346-51. 
43. Butler & Ribstein, Free at Last? The Contractual Theory of the Corporation and the 
New Maryland Officer-Director Liability Provisions, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 352, 353 
(1989). 
44. /d. 
45. /d. at 358. 
46. /d. at 356. 
47. Id. at 357. 
48. Id. at 358. 
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limit liability for breaches of duty of loyalty as well as breaches of duty of 
care.49 They criticize the statute, however, for denying shareholders the 
right to limit liability for acts involving improper personal benefit or acts 
which constitute active and deliberate dishonesty. These exceptions are 
criticized not only because they create ambiguities in the statute, 50 but 
also because shareholders should be given the option to contract away all 
liability of directors and officers to them if the shareholders so choose. 51 
Butler and Ribstein are also troubled that the statute only applies to law-
suits seeking money damages, but not equitable relief. They believe that 
shareholders should be permitted to waive equitable claims as well. To 
the extent the statute permits private ordering of rights, it is desirable; 
however Butler and Ribstein conclude that the Maryland statute falls 
short of completely permiting private ordering of such rights. 
To the extent the Maryland statute is consistent with the contract 
theory of corporations, it is criticized by Professor Zwier in his article "Is 
the Maryland Director-Officer Liability Statute Based on a Male-Ori-
ented Ethical Model?", Zwier prefers the trust theory of corporations-
where managers have an obligation to act selflessly for the benefit of 
others, especially those less able to protect themselves. 52 Rather than the 
self-interested, adversarial bargaining process which is the crux of the 
contract theory, the trust theory is based on the premise that the parties 
are not adversarial, but seek to help each other. 53 Zwier argues that the 
contract theory is not appropriate to corporate governance rules because 
it presumes relationships of roughly equal power between persons who 
are fully informed and aware of all possible risks at the beginning of the 
relationship. 54 In the corporate setting, however, Zwier believes that 
management is in a far superior position because it controls access to 
information and the day-to-day operations of the corporation. The typi-
cal shareholder is a passive shareholder and depends on management 
much like a child depends on a parent. 55 Therefore, a model emphasiz-
ing care and loyalty, rather than private bargaining, is appropriate. Ac-
cording to Zweir, the Maryland statute's elimination of the duty of care 
and duty of loyalty will be detrimental to shareholders, especially those 
with little business experience and those occupying minority positions in 
closely held corporations. 56 By validating an adversarial relationship be-
tween management and shareholders, the statute will also have a nega-
tive impact on the working atmosphere for management. 57 Insofar as the 
49. /d. at 362. 
50. /d. at 363. 
51. /d. at 363-64. 
52. Zwier, Is the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute Based on a Male-Ori-
ented Ethical Model?, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 368, 369 (1989). 
53. !d. at 370. 
54. /d. at 3.72. 
55. /d. at 370. 
56. /d. at 379. 
57. /d. 
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Maryland statute reflects a contract rather than a trust theory of corpo-
rations, Zwier concludes it is undesirable. 
The final article in the Symposium, "Nonprofit Corporations and 
Maryland's Director and Officer Liability Statute: A Study of the 
Mechanics of Maryland's Statutory Corporate Law," is a student com-
ment on the application of the new liability limitation statute to nonprofit 
corporations. After analyzing certain ambiguities and uncertainties in 
the statute's language and legislative history, the comment concludes 
that although the statute applies to nonprofit corporations, 58 its applica-
tion to those corporations may not be desirable because of the incompati-
bility of the contract theory with nonprofit corporations. 59 The comment 
suggests that the legislature should amend the statute so that it does not 
apply to nonprofit corporations. 
* * * * 
This Symposium provides a careful and critical analysis of the 
Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988. Only the draft-
ers of the legislation indicate unqualified support for it. Each of the other 
authors express reservations. 
Certain issues seem especially troublesome. Legislation aimed at en-
couraging qualified persons to serve on boards of directors and aimed at 
encouraging aggressive business decisions is laudable. The Maryland 
statute, however, does not entirely accomplish these goals; instead it 
leaves directors and officers exposed to lawsuits from third parties and 
still permits shareholder actions for equitable relief. Although the pay-
ment of money damages in most cases can be eliminated by a provision in 
the articles of incorporation, the expense, loss of time and possible dam-
age to reputation which may result from third party actions or injunctive 
actions60 will still act as a deterrent to service by some qualified persons. 
If it is true as the statute's defenders suggest that the new statute will not 
alter management decisionmaking and behavior,61 it is unclear whether 
the statute serves any useful purpose. 
One impetus to the legislation was the large increases in premiums 
for D&O insurance.62 It is far from clear, however, whether these in-
creases were justified, and whether the statute will lead to a rollback of 
premiums. Very few cases seeking money damages from directors or of-
ficers are successful. Unlike, for example, medical malpractice insurance 
where the insurance industry can point to recent large jury verdicts 
against insureds as a justification for increased premiums, there has not 
58. Comment, Nonprofit Corporations and Maryland's Director and Officer Liability 
Statute: A Study of the Mechanics of Maryland's Statutory Corporate Law, 18 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 384, 401 (1989). 
59. /d. at 399-400. 
60. Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4, at 237. 
61. /d. at 252. 
62. /d. at 236-37. 
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been a similar experience with D&O insurance. The problem may be 
with the insurance industry, not with the corporate governance rules. 
Concern is also caused by the statute's exceptions denying to the 
corporation the ability to limit liability if a director or officer received an 
improper personal benefit, and if a director or officer acted with active 
and deliberate dishonesty. The vagueness and ambiguity of these two 
exceptions will likely give rise to much litigation. Eschewing the excep-
tions and language of the Delaware statute in Maryland's attempt to 
"out-Delaware Delaware" deprives corporate counsel and Maryland 
courts from reliance on what will most likely be the largest body of case 
law on this issue, i.e., Delaware's. 63 
Although it is difficult to argue with the proposition that individuals 
should be able to bargain for the terms of their own relationships, it is 
not certain that this Maryland statute expands the ability of shareholders 
and management to define their relationship beyond what the Maryland 
statute provided before the new legislation. 64 Even before this new stat-
ute, courts had not interfered in corporate matters in circumstances 
where the parties had defined their own rights and liabilities. Nor did the 
courts suggest any interest in doing so in the future. 
Much was made in the Maryland legislature about the undesirability 
of a self-executing statute. The original 1987 legislation which was self-
executing was defeated. Most commentators believe, however, that it 
makes no difference whether a limitation of liability statute is self-execut-
ing or not because shareholders, when given the choice, overwhelmingly 
approve limitation of liability provisions because they invariably approve 
almost all proposals requested by management. 65 The legislative battle 
over the self-executing nature of the 1987 proposal, therefore, was most 
likely irrelevant in terms of affording shareholders additional protection. 
It should be remembered that liability limitation statutes are enacted 
not by persons who have decided to adopt a particular economic or ethi-
cal model, but rather by legislators and governors who are, above all else, 
politicians. Therefore Maryland's liability limitation statute should also 
be looked at from a political policy making point of view. Under this 
approach, certain issues create interest. What is the proper reaction of a 
legislature to threats by prominent local businesses to reincorporate in 
other states, especially when considering that a business' place of incor-
poration, although perhaps having·an impact on certain special interest 
63. The desirability of being able to rely on precedents from other states with compara-
ble statutes was acknowledged by the drafters of the original legislation in 1987. !d. 
at 237-38. Curiously, the states that the drafters looked to for guidance were Louisi-
ana and Indiana. !d. 
64. Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4, at 246. 
65. Honabach, supra note 36, at 331-32. There has been a slight trend away from share-
holder passivity by institutional investors, however, when asked to approve certain 
anti-takeover defenses suggested by management. 
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groups within that state, 66 has a minimal impact on the general condition 
of the state's economy? What quantum and quality of evidence should 
the legislature require in deciding whether a director and officer liability 
"crisis" exists? If no crisis exists, why has this been used as a justification 
for the statute? What was the "emergency" that convinced the legisla-
ture and the Governor that unlike most legislation, this legislation should 
take effect immediately?67 
This legislation also presents the interesting question of the proper 
role of local bar associations in promoting legislation. Is there any way 
to determine whether bar association subcommittees are acting as advo-
cates of the public interest or as advocates of the interests of particular 
clients? Should full disclosure of client lists be required of those who 
serve on such bar association subcommittees? 
The Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988 was 
portrayed to the legislature and the public as crucial to the economic 
well-being of the state. There is some question whether this is true. Per-
haps the Maryland liability limitation statute can be best understood as a 
symbol that Maryland will cooperate with business and its advocates so 
that jobs are kept in Maryland. Even though the liability limitation stat-
ute itself may not have a direct impact on jobs in Maryland, the symbolic 
value it carries may bear an indirect impact. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, the gesture of enacting this statute may be more important than its 
actual operation. 
66. Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporation Law, 65 
TEXAS L. REV. 469 (1987). 
67. See, e.g., Note, Agency Discretion to Accept Comment in Informal Rulemaking: 
What Constitutes "Good Cause" Under the Administrative Procedure Act?, 1980 
B.Y.U. L. REv. 93 (1981) (discussing when good cause exists to make administra-
tive regulations effective without thirty-day waiting period). 
